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______________________
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deceased, on Behalf of Said Decedent’s
Heirs-At-Law and Next-Of-Kin and on Her Own Behalf,
Respondent/Appellee
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
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_______________________________________
Consolidated Petition For A Writ of Mandamus And
Appeal From the United States District Court For
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. PA Civ. No. 94-cv-02579)
_________________________________________
Argued: January 28, 1997
Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and
ORLOFSKY, District Judge.*
_______________
(Filed April 9, 1997)

JOSEPH V. PINTO, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
EVAN S. EISNER, ESQUIRE
ROBERT TOLAND, II, ESQUIRE
White and Williams
1800 One Liberty Place
1650 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7395

*

Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States District
Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
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JOHN M. THOMAS, ESQUIRE
Ford Motor Company
Office of General Counsel
1500 Parklane Towers West
Suite 1500
Dearborn, MI 48126
Attorneys for Petitioner in No. 96-2092
Appellant in No. 96-2133, Ford Motor Company
ROBERT C. DANIELS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
LARRY BENDESKY, ESQUIRE
Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, LTD.
One Liberty Place, 34th Floor
1650 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7395
Attorneys for Respondent in No. 96-2092
Appellee in No. 96-2133, Susan I. Kelly
__________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
By this appeal and companion petition for a writ of mandamus
in one of the Bronco II product liability cases, the defendant
Ford Motor Company, invoking the attorney-client privilege and/or
the work product doctrine, challenges a district court order
denying it protection from disclosure in discovery of certain
documents requested by the plaintiff, Susan Kelly.

The question

of the appropriate jurisdictional vehicle is precedentially
important, for our ability to review such disputes is frequently
called into question.

Therefore, as a threshold matter, we

address the question whether the challenged order is appealable,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or reviewable by mandamus, see 28 U.S.C. §
1651.
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We conclude that, because the district court’s order finally
resolved an important issue separate from the merits that would
be effectively unreviewable after final judgment, we have
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.

In

reaching this conclusion, we consider in some detail the anatomy
of the “importance” facet of that doctrine, and we necessarily
resolve certain tensions that exist in our recent jurisprudence
in the area.

Because we have appellate jurisdiction, we do not

review the challenged order by way of mandamus, even though our
case law would require us to do so if we lacked appellate
jurisdiction.
In contrast, the merits issues are quite straightforward.
We have examined each of the documents in question in camera.
They fall into two groups -- minutes of a meeting attended by
top-level executives of Ford Motor Company regarding the Bronco
II, and agendas for a discussion of the technical characteristics
of the Bronco II.

We conclude that the minutes of the meeting

reflect that the recorded communications were for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and hence are protected by the attorneyclient privilege.

With respect to the agendas and the

handwritten notes referring to them, we determine that they were
produced by an agent of an attorney in preparation for litigation
and hence are protected by the work product doctrine; the other
requirements for work product doctrine are not at issue.

We

will, therefore, reverse the challenged portions of the district
court’s order and remand with directions to issue an appropriate
order protecting the documents from discovery.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the underlying lawsuit, Kelly claims that Ford
defectively designed the Bronco II, a four-wheel drive utility
vehicle with a relatively high center of gravity, by rendering it
too susceptible to rollover.1

That defective design, Kelly

submits, caused the death of her husband, Gerald Kelly, who was
killed when the Bronco II he was driving rolled over.

Kelly

sought to discover Ford documents related to the development,
marketing, and safety of the Bronco II.

Ford responded, in part,

by asserting that the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine shielded certain documents from discovery.

Ford

sought from the district court a protective order that would have
preserved the confidentiality of those documents.

By letter

ruling of October 4, 1996, the district court held that, for the
vast majority of documents for which Ford sought protection, the
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine
applied.

However, the court found that two sets of documents --

those at issue here -- were discoverable.
The first set of documents is the final draft of the minutes
of a November 18, 1982 meeting of Ford’s Policy and Strategy
Committee.

The Policy and Strategy Committee is made up of top

executives at Ford, and acts as an advisory body to Ford’s chief
executive officer.

At the meeting in question, Ford’s general

counsel, Henry R. Nolte, Jr., briefed the committee about a
report he had drafted regarding the Bronco II.
1

According to the

Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
U.S.C. § 1332.
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See 28

minutes, the committee engaged in an extensive discussion of the
report and ultimately adopted the recommendations contained
therein.
The second set of documents is composed of a series of
agendas, one with handwritten notations, for a meeting in 1988,
and one document pertaining to a 1989 meeting on which
handwritten notes refer to the 1988 agendas.

By 1988, numerous

lawsuits similar to that brought by Kelly were pending, alleging
faulty design of the Bronco II.

As part of its defense strategy,

Ford retained an outside technical consultant, Failure Analysis
Associates (FAA), to assist in the defense of those lawsuits.
FAA, in turn, relied in part on the help of in-house technical
assistants to Ford.

Ernest Grush, one of these technical

assistants, prepared the agendas for the 1988 meeting.

The

meeting was called to explain the technical aspects of the Bronco
II litigation defense strategy, and Ford attorneys were present.
Grush has declared that the handwritten notes on the document
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are his, and that they refer to
the 1988 meeting.
On October 4, 1996, the district court made a letter ruling
denying protection for the documents here at issue.
requested that the court reconsider its decision.

Ford
On November

13, 1996, the court denied Ford’s request and, by a subsequent
letter ruling of November 27, 1996, ordered the production of the
documents by December 18, 1996.

The mandamus petition followed.

On December 18, the court again ordered the production of the
documents.

Ford sought and we granted a motion for a stay of the
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December 18 order.
December 18 ruling.

Ford also filed a notice of appeal from the
We consolidated the appeal and the petition

for a writ of mandamus and will, therefore, consider them
together.
II.
A.

APPELLATE AND MANDAMUS JURISDICTION
Introduction; The First Prong of Cohen

The question of our jurisdiction is somewhat complicated.

A

writ of mandamus is an extraordinary exercise of our
jurisdiction; moreover, such a writ is not a substitute for
appeal.

See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996).

Because we will not issue a writ of mandamus if relief may be
granted by way of an ordinary appeal, we must first determine
whether Ford may appeal the district court’s ruling.

See

Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996).
A fortiori, only if an appeal is unavailable will we determine
whether a writ of mandamus will issue.

See PAS v. Travelers Ins.

Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993).
As a general rule, discovery orders are not final orders of
the district court for purposes of obtaining appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
F.2d at 461.

See Hahnemann Univ., 74

Therefore, discovery orders normally may not be

appealed until after final judgment.

See id.

However, the

collateral order doctrine, first enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),
provides a narrow exception to the general rule permitting
appellate review only of final orders.

An appeal of a nonfinal

order will lie if (1) the order from which the appellant appeals
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conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the order
resolves an important issue that is completely separate from the
merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

See Rhone-Poulenc

Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 860 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is beyond cavil that the first element is satisfied here.
The district court’s December 18 order requiring the production
of the disputed documents leaves no room for further
consideration by the district court of the claim that the
documents are protected.
B.

The Second Prong of Cohen
1.

Separability

The most familiar aspect of the second prong of Cohen is
separability from the merits.

Kelly submits that a determination

of the issues of privilege and work product will in fact
implicate the merits of the underlying dispute.
it will not.

We believe that

As we understand the merits of the underlying case,

Kelly seeks to show what Ford knew about the alleged rollover
propensity of the Bronco II, when it knew about this alleged
propensity, and what it did about the alleged propensity.

The

contents of the documents will certainly shed some light on these
questions.

However, our resolution of the privilege and work

product issues has nothing to do with them.

We are not concerned

at this juncture about what Ford knew, when it gained this
knowledge, or what it did about it.

Our inquiry largely involves

questions of context -- e.g., who prepared the relevant
documents, when were they prepared, and what was their purpose.
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It involves content only insofar as we must ensure that the
documents were prepared in certain contexts -- e.g., do the
documents contain legal advice or do they disclose legal
strategies?

We are not required, nor will we undertake, to

resolve disputed questions of Ford’s knowledge of and Ford’s
actions with respect to the alleged rollover propensity.
Kelly’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, neither
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986),
nor State of New York v. United States Metals Refining Co., 771
F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter USMR], undermine this
conclusion.

In both Cipollone and USMR, the defendants sought to

protect materials gathered for or discovered during litigation
from public dissemination.

Each defendant claimed that the

sought-after material somehow distorted the actual facts and
would, therefore, mislead the public about those facts.2

That

claim, we held in both cases, would require us to examine the
merits of the underlying dispute because we would need to make
some determination of the actual facts presented by the case so
as to compare them to the allegedly distorting or misleading
material.
799-800.

See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1117; USMR, 771 F.2d at
No such determination need be made here.

We can

resolve the privilege and work product issues without delving
into the disputed facts about Ford’s knowledge and actions.
2

In Cipollone, the defendants claimed that the material at
issue, though not trade secrets, would nonetheless cause
embarrassment if released. See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121. In
USMR, the defendant sought to keep confidential a report that the
plaintiffs had prepared detailing the pollution at the
defendant’s plant. See USMR, 771 F.2d at 798.
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2.

Importance

The parties have not suggested that the “importance”
criterion is not satisfied.

However, because of our independent

responsibility to examine our own jurisdiction sua sponte, and
because the jurisprudence surrounding the importance criterion is
somewhat murky, we will undertake a close analysis of this aspect
of the collateral order doctrine.

Although “[m]ost courts have

paid little attention to the ‘importance’ requirement,” John C.
Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals
Jurisprudence With Discretionary Review, 44 Duke L.J. 200, 207
(1994), the Supreme Court has recently made patent that confusion
over the criterion cannot lead to the conclusion that
“‘importance’ is itself unimportant.”
Desktop Direct, Inc.,
(1994).3

U.S.

Digital Equip. Corp. v.

, 114 S. Ct. 1992, 2001

Rather, application of the Cohen collateral order

3

In some formulations of the collateral order doctrine, the
importance criterion is contained in the second prong of the
test; in others, it is considered a factor in the third prong.
See Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001. Although the language in
Cohen itself implies that it is a separate element of the
collateral order test, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (“This decision
appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”)
(emphasis added), the most frequently cited Supreme Court
statement of the test incorporates the importance criterion in
the second prong, see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978) (“To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions
excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.”) (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court
recently suggested that the importance criterion is a necessary
part of the third prong of the test. See Digital Equip., 114 S.
Ct. at 2001 (“[T]he third Cohen question . . . simply cannot be
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doctrine is incomplete without an analysis of the importance of
the issue sought to be reviewed.
Importance has a particular meaning in this context.

It

does not only refer to general jurisprudential importance.
Rather, the overarching principle governing “importance” is that,
for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the
interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate
appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the
efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the
final judgment rule.4

In Johnson v. Jones,

U.S.

, 115 S.

Ct. 2151 (1995), for example, the Supreme Court noted that any
analysis of the Cohen test required an examination of the
competing considerations that underlie finality, i.e., the costs
answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that
would be lost through rigorous application of the final judgment
requirement.”). Indeed, the ratio decidendi of this portion of
the opinion, see infra, has third prong overtones. Yet, in its
most recent pronouncement on the collateral order doctrine, the
Court included “importance” as a separate prong. See Quackenbush
v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
U.S.
, 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1718-19
(1996). As noted in the text, this court generally incorporates
the importance criterion within the second prong. No matter
where it is placed, however, it is clear that it must be examined
in order to satisfy the collateral order doctrine.
4

The Supreme Court has recently described the interests
protected by the final judgment rule as follows:
An interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial
judges to do their basic job -- supervising trial
proceedings. It can threaten those proceedings with delay,
adding costs and diminishing coherence. It also risks
additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work either
when it presents appellate courts with less developed
records or when it brings them appeals that, had the trial
simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary.
Johnson v. Jones,

U.S.

, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2154 (1995).
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of piecemeal review on the one hand against the costs of delay on
the other.

See id. at 2157.

The Court in Digital Equipment

stated this in a slightly different manner, noting that the Cohen
test requires a “judgment about the value of the interests that
would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment
requirement,” Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001, and that
“‘important’ in Cohen’s sense [means] being weightier than the
societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final
judgment principles,” id. at 2002.

As a final example, Justice

Scalia, in a concurrence, stated that a right is important for
Cohen purposes only if it “overcome[s] the policies militating
against interlocutory appeals.”

See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v.

Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 503 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Although one might assume that collateral finality would be
determined by a bright-line rule, the importance determination
under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is rather a function of a
balancing process.

See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier,

U.S.

116 S. Ct. 834, 844 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (canvassing
recent collateral order jurisprudence and noting that the
importance analysis is a balancing of interests); Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. at 2157 (stating that in determining appealability a court
must look to the competing considerations that underlie questions
of finality, namely “the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal
review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay
on the other” (citations omitted)).

When engaging in this

balancing, the Court has relied on a number of factors.
mention here only a few contained in recent cases.

11

We

In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

U.S.

, 116 S.

Ct. 1712 (1996), the Court allowed the immediate appeal of an
abstention-based remand in part because the interests implicated
by the appeal -- namely, the scope of federal jurisdiction and
the desire for comity between the federal and the individual
state judicial systems -- were sufficiently important.
at 1719-20.

See id.

In Digital Equipment, the Court reasoned that a

right contained in a private settlement agreement was not
sufficiently important in part because that right did not
“originat[e] in the Constitution or statutes.”
114 S. Ct. at 2001.

Digital Equip.,

In Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993), the

Court allowed the immediate appeal of a denial of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in part because the right at issue “involves a
claim to a fundamental constitutional protection.”

Id. at 688.

And, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court
allowed the immediate appeal of a claim to qualified immunity in
part because such immunity was intended to reduce “‘the general
costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial -distraction of officials from their governmental duties,
inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people
from public service.’”

Id. at 526 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)).
In all of these cases, the Court has compared the apple of
the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation to the orange of, for
example, federalism.5

In terms of analytic purity, the results

5

In addition to the collateral order doctrine cases cited
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of such comparisons are, of course, debatable.

What is important

for present purposes is that, in a number of the just-cited
cases, the Court felt that, because of the imperative of
preventing impairment of some institutionally significant status
or relationship, the danger of denying justice by reason of delay
in appellate adjudication outweighed the inefficiencies flowing
from interlocutory appeal.

By the same calipers, we are

convinced that in the present case the orange of the interests
protected by the attorney-client privilege (which would be
eviscerated by forced disclosure of privileged material) is
sufficiently significant relative to the apple of the interests
protected by the final judgment rule to satisfy the importance
criterion of the second Cohen prong.
In the few cases in which our court has addressed the
importance criterion, we have been less than pellucid in our
elsewhere in this opinion, we list in this footnote a number of
Supreme Court collateral order doctrine cases and the issues that
were appealed therein as illustrative of the type of balancing
that might be implicated. The list is not exhaustive, nor does
the Court explicitly engage in balancing in each of the cases.
Those cases are: Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n,
U.S.
,
115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995) (municipal liability); Midland Asphalt
Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989) (public disclosure of
grand jury matters); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517
(1988) (service of process and forum non conveniens); Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988)
(abstention-related stay); J.B. Stringfellow, Jr. v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (intervention);
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)
(disqualification of counsel); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (abstention-related
stay); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368
(1981) (disqualification of counsel); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U.S. 500 (1979) (Speech and Debate Clause); United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (speedy trial); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy).
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discussion.

For example, we stated in Nemours Found. v.

Manganaro Corp., New England, 878 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1989), that
the issue on appeal must be important “in a jurisprudential
sense,” see id. at 100, without explaining what is meant by
“jurisprudential.”

And, in examining whether the relevant issue

was important, we have from time to time (though not
consistently) raised the question whether the issue presents “a
serious and unsettled question.”

See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v.

Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1282 (3d Cir. 1993); Praxis
Properties v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 1991).
“A serious and unsettled question” is a factor mentioned in
Cohen, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547, but, for the most part, it has
been ignored by the courts, see Robert J. Martineau, Defining
Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong
Solution, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 717, 740 (1993).
We believe that presenting a serious and unsettled question
is merely one means by which an issue may be important under
Cohen.

It is clear that if a question presents a serious and

unsettled question of law, resolution of that issue in an
interlocutory appeal protects an interest that is significant
relative to the interests protected by deferring review until
final judgment.

Resolution of a serious and unsettled question

has an impact beyond the parties before the court; it not only
ensures the proper adjudication of the case before the court, but
also may prevent erroneous adjudications in other cases and head
off unnecessary appeals in those other cases.

These incidental

effects promote some of the same goals the final judgment rule
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promotes.

Therefore, though it is not a sine qua non, the

presence of a serious and unsettled question is sufficient to
satisfy the importance criterion of the Cohen test.6
Given our analysis of importance for Cohen purposes, we
believe that the attorney-client privilege question before us
also satisfies the importance criterion because the interests
protected by the privilege are significant relative to the
interests advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.

It

is often stated that the attorney-client privilege is at the
heart of the adversary system; its purpose is to support that
system by promoting loyalty and trust between an attorney and a
client.

See Recent Case, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 779 n.39 (1995).

The privilege is thereby intended to advance the “broad[] public
interests in the observance of law and administration of
6

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), is a case in
which the Supreme Court stated that an appeal must present a
serious and unsettled question to fall within Cohen’s scope. See
id. at 742. However, in so doing, the Court seemed to imply that
a serious and unsettled question is merely one part of Cohen’s
importance requirement. In determining that the appeal before it
did present a serious and unsettled question, the Court relied on
the fact that it had never ruled on the question; that the Court
of Appeals had done so did not settle the question for Cohen
purposes. See id. at 743. This is curious reasoning; following
it to its logical extreme, it would categorize as serious and
unsettled any issue the Supreme Court has not decided. At all
events, later in Nixon the Court seems to limit this reasoning.
It noted that the case before it pertained to sensitive issues
related to the separation of powers between the executive and
judicial branches of government. See id. The mention of these
sensitive issues “might hint that the calculus of appeal includes
the importance of the interests involved as well as the general
importance of the question to other litigants.” 15A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3911.5, at 431 (2d ed. 1994). As is evident in
the text, our rendering of the importance prong is consistent
with this discussion.
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justice,” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981),
by encouraging the full and frank communication between attorney
and client necessary for vigorous and effective advocacy.
Rightly or wrongly, our system assumes that the competition
between vigorous and effective advocates, when pitted against
each other in an adversary setting, will help to produce the best
legal result in any given litigation.

In short, the attorney-

client privilege is one of the pillars that supports the edifice
that is our adversary system.
public policy.”

As such, it is “deeply rooted in

Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2004.

Privilege doctrine assumes that protecting that loyalty and
trust and thereby advancing these broader interests can only be
accomplished if privileged material is never disclosed, for only
then will clients be encouraged to make full disclosure to their
attorneys.

By fostering confidentiality, the attorney-client

privilege, when vindicated, undermines some of the goals the
final judgment rule seeks to realize.

Without the benefit of the

material protected by the attorney-client privilege, trial courts
face a more difficult fact-finding task.

Ferreting out the facts

of a case becomes more costly, even if only marginally.

Often,

the privilege will keep trial courts, juries, and appellate
courts from considering certain facts, thereby forcing them to
decide cases based on less than complete records.
In all, the privilege introduces certain inefficiencies into
the judicial system, the same inefficiencies with which the final
judgment rule is concerned.

See supra note 4.

Yet, every

jurisdiction in this nation recognizes the attorney-client
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privilege.

For the reasons set forth supra, the attorney-client

privilege is thus important in the Cohen sense; the status or
relationship, deeply embedded in our legal culture, is of
sufficient importance that the danger of denying justice by delay
in appellate adjudication (which would result in irremediable
disclosure of privileged material) outweighs the inefficiencies
introduced by immediate appeal.

Accordingly, prong two of Cohen

is satisfied as to the attorney-client privilege question.
For similar reasons, the work product doctrine, at least at
its “core,” satisfies the importance criterion.7

Like the

attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine seeks to
promote the adversary system.

It does so “by protecting the

confidentiality of papers prepared by or on behalf of attorneys
in anticipation of litigation.”

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.

Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).
Absent such protection, attorneys would “fear that their work
product will be used against their clients,” id., and may become
overly circumspect in preparing for litigation thereby reducing
their effectiveness as advocates.

Such circumspection frustrates

the assumptions on which the adversary system is based.
7

“Core”

By the “core,” we mean the “mental impressions,
conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Such core work product is generally afforded near absolute
protection from discovery. See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2026
(2d ed. 1994). Because, as we discuss infra, the work product at
issue here is at the core of the doctrine, we have no occasion to
discuss whether work product generally is important for Cohen
purposes.
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work product thus reflects an institutionally important status or
relationship in the law.
As with the attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine rests on the non-disclosure of information.

Some of

this information is potentially relevant to the disposition of
the litigation; keeping it confidential might therefore impede
the efficient functioning of the judicial system.

Yet, the work

product doctrine, or a form of it, is widely recognized.

Thus,

for the same reasons put forth in our treatment of the attorneyclient privilege, core work product, such as at issue here, meets
the importance criterion and satisfies the second Cohen prong.
C.

Effective Review:

The Third Prong of Cohen

The only remaining issue is the third element of the Cohen
test, whether Ford can seek effective review of the privilege and
work product issues on appeal after final judgment.

The Supreme

Court has stated that review after final judgment is ineffective
if the right sought to be protected would be, for all practical
and legal purposes, destroyed if it were not vindicated prior to
final judgment.

See, e.g., Lauro Lines, 109 S. Ct. at 1978.

In

the context of mandamus jurisdiction, we have repeatedly held
that appealing privilege and work product issues after final
judgment is ineffective.

See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861

(discussing “privilege or other interests of confidentiality”);
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992)
(discussing both attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine protections); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1422 (same);
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
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work product doctrine protections); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); see also Hahnemann
Univ., 74 F.3d at 461 (discussing possible mandamus jurisdiction
to review claim that documents were protected by, inter alia, a
state law psychotherapist-patient privilege); Glenmede Trust Co.
v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing
mandamus jurisdiction over review of the terms of a protective
order); Smith v. BIC Corp, 869 F.2d 194, 198-99 (3d Cir. 1989)
(discussing the collateral order doctrine in the context of
reviewing a claim that disputed documents contained trade secrets
requiring protection); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d
335, 340 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing mandamus jurisdiction over
review of a protective order).
Undergirding those previous holdings is the notion that,
once putatively protected material is disclosed, the very “right
sought to be protected” has been destroyed.
at 591.

Bogosian, 738 F.2d

That is so because, as we noted previously, underlying

the attorney-client privilege is the policy of encouraging full
and frank communications between an attorney and client, without
the fear of disclosure, so as to aid in the administration of
justice.

See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423.

Concomitantly, the work product doctrine is designed to promote
the adversarial process by maintaining the confidentiality of
documents prepared by or for attorneys in anticipation of
litigation.

See, e.g., id. at 1428.

Appeal after final judgment

cannot remedy the breach in confidentiality occasioned by
erroneous disclosure of protected materials.
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At best, on appeal

after final judgment, an appellate court could send the case back
for re-trial without use of the protected materials.

At that

point, however, the cat is already out of the bag.
As the Second Circuit aptly stated with respect to the
attorney-client privilege, the limited assurance that the
protected material will not be disclosed at trial “will not
suffice to ensure free and full communication by clients who do
not rate highly a privilege that is operative only at the time of
trial.”

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964

F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992).

With respect to material otherwise

protected by the work product doctrine, the party will be
similarly irremediably disadvantaged by erroneous disclosure.
“[A]ttorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to them in
discovery”; they are likely to use such material for evidentiary
leads, strategy decisions, or the like.

Id.

More colorfully,

there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the
disclosure; the baby has been thrown out with the bath water.
Our conclusions with respect to privilege and work product
issues are buttressed by Supreme Court decisions allowing
immediate appeal of official, qualified, and Eleventh Amendment
immunities; of double jeopardy challenges; and of speech or
debate challenges.

In each of those cases, the Court held that

the rights asserted protected the claimant against trial, not
just liability.8

Therefore, delaying review of orders

8

See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc.,
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. 684, 687-89 (1993) (examining
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
525-27 (1985) (examining qualified immunity); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43 (1982) (examining absolute
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implicating these asserted rights would preclude vindication of
those very rights because delay would allow trial to proceed.
The same is true as to privilege and work product issues.

Delay

in such cases would allow the very disclosure against which those
rules protect.
In most of our previous cases in which a party sought
appellate review of an order requiring the disclosure of
putatively protected documents, we did not allow review under the
collateral order doctrine either because it was not raised at all
by the parties or because the parties did not satisfy either
element (1) or element (2) of the Cohen test.

In only two cases

did we examine element (3) of the Cohen test in this context.

In

Smith, we held that a party does not have an effective means of
appealing after a final judgment an order requiring the
disclosure of trade secrets.

As we stated there, “once trade

secrets are made public, they can obviously never be ‘secrets’
again.”

Smith, 869 F.2d at 199.

Therefore, the court allowed an

interlocutory appeal under the Cohen test and did not reach the
question whether a writ of mandamus was appropriate.

See id. at

199 n.3.
In the later Rhone-Poulenc case, the other case to examine
element (3) of the Cohen test, the panel distinguished Smith by
reasoning that any harm caused by the erroneous disclosure of
material protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work
immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979)
(examining the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 660-662 (1977) (examining double jeopardy).

21

product doctrine can be remedied.

According to that panel, an

appellate court can, after final judgment, vacate the ruling of a
trial court, remand the case for a new trial, and prohibit the
use of the protected material or any material derived from the
protected material at the new trial.
at 860.

See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d

We believe, however, that this part of the holding in

Rhone-Poulenc is inconsistent with both Smith and the mandamus
line of cases that hold that there can be no effective review
after final judgment of an order requiring the disclosure of
putatively protected material.

See supra.

In fact, Rhone-

Poulenc seems to say as much when it held that mandamus
jurisdiction existed because there is “no other adequate means to
attain relief from the district court’s order that compels the
disclosure of privileged information and work product,” citing
the mandamus line of cases for support.

Id. at 861.

Because they precede Rhone-Poulenc, we are bound by the
holdings in Smith and the mandamus line of cases.

See O. Hommel

Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] panel
of this court cannot overrule a prior panel precedent.”).
Therefore, we hold that there is no effective means of reviewing
after a final judgment an order requiring the production of
putatively protected material.

Accordingly, the strictures of

the collateral order doctrine have been met in this case, and we
have jurisdiction over the appeal.

Our review of the district

court order will be plenary.
D.

Mandamus

Because we have appellate jurisdiction, there is no need to
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examine whether we have original, mandamus jurisdiction.
However, we also believe that if we did not have appellate
jurisdiction, we would have mandamus jurisdiction to review the
district court’s order.

See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861

(exercising mandamus jurisdiction over review of privilege and
work product issues); Haines, 975 F.2d at 88-91 (exercising
mandamus jurisdiction over review of work product issues);
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1422 (exercising mandamus jurisdiction
over privilege and work product issues); Sporck, 759 F.2d at 31415 (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over work product issues);
Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 591 (same).
The practical difference between appellate jurisdiction and
mandamus jurisdiction is the standard of review.

Our standard of

review under appellate jurisdiction is plenary; our standard of
review under mandamus jurisdiction is for a clear error of law.
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423.

Accordingly, mandamus

jurisdiction affords an appellate court less opportunity to
correct district court error in the case before it and less
opportunity to provide guidance for future cases.

Moreover,

comity between the district and appellate courts is best served
by resort to mandamus only in limited circumstances.

Review

under appellate jurisdiction is therefore preferable to review
under mandamus jurisdiction.

In light of this preference, the

wisdom of our holding that an appeal will lie in this case is
confirmed.
III.

MINUTES OF THE 1982 MEETING; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

After an in camera review of the relevant documents, we
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conclude that the final minutes of the 1982 meeting are protected
by the attorney-client privilege.

Primarily at issue is whether

the communications memorialized by the minutes were made for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice.

Federal Rule of Evidence 501

states:
[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501.

In this civil, diversity case in which state

law governs, Rule 501 provides that state law will govern the
issue of privilege.

See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861-62.

It is not clear whether the law of Pennsylvania, the forum
state, or the law of Michigan, the state in which the
communications occurred, will supply the rule as to privilege.
We need not reach this potentially thorny issue, however, because
the law as to attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania does not
differ in any significant way from that in Michigan.

The

elements of the attorney-client privilege are well-known and are
not, in any material respect, disputed here.

We need not,

therefore, dwell on them, except to note their basic contours in
Pennsylvania and Michigan.
In Pennsylvania, the attorney-client privilege in civil
matters has been codified.

The relevant statutory provision

reads:
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to
testify to confidential communications made to him by his
client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the
same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon
the trial of the client.
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42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5928 (West 1982).

The communications

must be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.

See Leonard

Packel & Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 501.1(c), at
306 & n.22 (1987 & Supp. 1995).

A corporation may claim the

privilege for communications between its counsel and its
employees who have authority to act on its behalf.

See Maleski

v. Corporate Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994);
Packel & Poulin, supra, § 501.1(b).
In Michigan, the standard is stated in similar terms.

The

attorney-client privilege “attaches to the confidential
communications made by a client to his attorney acting as a legal
adviser and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice on
some right or obligation.”
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985).

Kubiak v. Hurr, 372 N.W. 2d 341, 345

Case law in Michigan also recognizes the

right of a corporation to claim the privilege to protect
communications between certain of its employees and its counsel.
See Hubka v. Pennfield Township, 494 N.W. 2d 800, 802 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (interpreting
the federal Freedom of Information Act)), rev’d on other grounds,
504 N.W. 2d 183 (Mich. 1993).
Our brief review of Pennsylvania and Michigan law as to the
attorney-client privilege reveals that the two states agree in
the respect most relevant to our case: for a communication to be
privileged, it must have been made for the purpose of securing
legal advice.

See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 862 (setting

out the traditional elements of the attorney-client privilege and
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including the requirement that the communication be made for the
purpose of securing legal advice); Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers §§ 118, 122 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996)
(same).9

We now turn to determining whether the communications

contained in the relevant document satisfy this standard.10
Our review of the final minutes, the draft minutes, the
report Nolte summarized at the meeting, and relevant affidavits,
leads us to conclude that the communications in the meeting were
made for the purpose of securing legal advice.

Ford clearly had

concerns about the Bronco II; this is not surprising given that
the product was in the early stages of its development.

Nolte

examined the legal implications of some of those concerns and
proposed a particular course of action, contained in his report
to the Policy and Strategy Committee, to address them.

The

Policy and Strategy Committee meeting itself was called in part
to discuss Nolte’s proposal.

The discussion at the meeting,

then, was intended to secure Nolte’s legal advice.
The district court initially ruled that the minutes
9

It should be noted that the law makes no distinction
between communications made by a client and those made by an
attorney, provided the communications are for the purpose of
securing legal advice. See Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers §§ 118, 120 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996). In other
words, the entire discussion between a client and an attorney
undertaken to secure legal advice is privileged, no matter
whether the client or the attorney is speaking.
10

The parties do not dispute that Nolte was Ford’s attorney
at all relevant times and that the members of the Policy and
Strategy Committee had the authority to act on behalf of Ford.
Although Kelly does argue that Ford did not intend for the
communications to be kept confidential, we find that argument to
be without merit. Ford’s actions with respect to these documents
clearly evinced such an intent.
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“disclose only factual material, contain no legal discussion,
were not created in anticipation of litigation . . ., and contain
no communication to counsel which was intended to be kept
confidential.”

The court later stated that the minutes were

“business records” that memorialized “essentially business and
safety decisions.”

We disagree with the district court’s

conclusions as to the nature of the documents.

The documents do

not contain merely factual material nor do they detail mere
business decisions.

Certainly, the ultimate decision reached by

the Policy and Strategy Committee could be characterized as a
business decision, but the Committee reached that decision only
after examining the legal implications of doing so.

Even if the

decision was driven, as the district court seemed to assume,
principally by profit and loss, economics, marketing, public
relations, or the like, it was also infused with legal concerns,
and was reached only after securing legal advice.

At all events,

disclosure of the documents would reveal that legal advice.
We thus hold that the minutes of the 1982 meeting are
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.11
11

Discussion in a published opinion of our conclusions based
upon an in camera review is necessarily limited. We cannot
reveal too much about the contents of the documents for fear of
undermining the very purposes of such review. Our methodology is
to reveal only as much of the content as is necessary to produce
a reasoned opinion that can itself be reviewed. If further
review is necessary, the en banc court or the Supreme Court can
examine for itself the relevant documents in conjunction with our
opinion. We recognize that the advocacy of the attorneys
representing the party seeking allegedly protected documents is
hampered by their inability to review those same documents. That
disadvantage is one we must accept; otherwise, the very purpose
of the privilege will be destroyed.
The observations made in this footnote apply equally to our
discussion of the documents allegedly protected by the work

27

IV.

THE AGENDAS; THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE

Similarly, our in camera review leads us to conclude that
the agendas for the 1988 meeting and the handwritten notes on the
document pertaining to the 1989 meeting are protected from
discovery by the work product doctrine.12

Codified in the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the work product doctrine
allows a party to discover material prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial only upon a showing that the requesting
party has a substantial need for the material and cannot obtain
the material or its equivalent elsewhere without incurring a
substantial hardship.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

The rule as

codified provides that “[i]n ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.”

Id.

product doctrine.
12

Ford claims that the agendas are also protected by the
attorney-client privilege. We disagree. There is no indication
in the record that the relevant 1988 meeting at which the agendas
were discussed involved the kind of communications the privilege
protects. Ford’s assertions to the contrary and the affidavits
supporting them are nothing more than conclusory.
Ford also claims that the handwritten notes on a document
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are protected by the attorneyclient privilege because they refer to legal advice provided at
the 1988 meeting. (Ford does not claim that the meeting itself
or the typewritten portions of the document are protected.)
Because we do not see the 1988 meeting as involving confidential
communications made to secure legal advice, we do not believe
these handwritten notes are privileged. However, these notes do
refer to the agendas from the 1988 meetings and to the studies on
which the agendas were based. We will, therefore, consider these
notes as being equivalent to the 1988 agendas. As we discuss in
the text, the 1988 agendas are protected by the work product
doctrine. These notes, then, are similarly protected.
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It is also clear that the work product doctrine protects
materials prepared by an agent of the attorney, provided that
material was prepared in anticipation of litigation.

See 8

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at 359 (2d ed. 1994).
These elements, like those of the attorney-client privilege, are
well-known and are not, in any relevant respect, disputed here.
We need not, therefore, elaborate on them.

Rather, the dispute

over the agendas turns on whether they were prepared in
anticipation of litigation, since the other elements necessary
for work product protection are met.13
It is clear from our review of the record that the agendas
disclose material prepared as part of Ford’s legal strategy for
defending the type of case Kelly brought here.

The agendas

outline the results of studies conducted as to the safety of the
Bronco II and, in so doing, highlight important aspects of those
studies.

Those studies were found by the district court to be

protected by the work product doctrine because they would be used
in defending anticipated lawsuits.

Ford persuasively contends

that experts acting on behalf of Kelly and working backwards from
the agendas could determine the methodology of the studies.14
Ford’s attorneys and their agents called for the studies, and
13

The record makes it clear that the agendas were prepared
by an agent of Ford’s attorneys. In addition, Kelly has not made
the requisite showing of substantial need to overcome the work
product doctrine protections.
14

Although Kelly does not dispute this contention, we
suspect that it might have been difficult for Kelly to do so
given that she has not seen the agendas.
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Ford credibly demonstrates that if Kelly learns the methodology
of the studies, then she has effectively learned of the issues of
most concern to Ford’s litigation defense team.

Moreover, the

agendas themselves were for meetings at which the experts would,
inter alia, explain the technical aspects of Ford’s legal defense
strategy by referring to those studies.

We are satisfied, in

view of the foregoing, that these agendas, core work product,
were prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The handwritten notations that appear on the document
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are similarly protected by the
work product doctrine.

Although not as extensive as the agendas

themselves, the notations refer to the agendas.

In some places,

the notations employ the same language as that which appears on
the agendas.

In others, the notations, when read in connection

with the typewritten portions of the document to which they
refer, provide clear hints as to what is contained in the
agendas.

In all instances, the notations, like the agendas

themselves, would allow Kelly to determine the methodology of the
studies.
It is true, of course, that the agendas and the handwritten
notations (and, for that matter, the studies themselves) were not
prepared with this particular litigation in mind.
is of no import given the facts of this case.

However, that

At the time the

relevant material was prepared, Ford was a defendant in numerous
lawsuits alleging defects in the Bronco II, and this material was
prepared in anticipation of those lawsuits.

The literal language

of Rule 26(b)(3) requires that the material be prepared in
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anticipation of some litigation, not necessarily in anticipation
of the particular litigation in which it is being sought.

See In

re Grand Jury Proceeding, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the work product doctrine will protect material
prepared in anticipation of civil proceedings from discovery in a
grand jury proceeding); see also 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus,
supra, § 2024, at 350-51 (collecting cases and concluding that
most courts consider the work product doctrine to protect
material prepared in anticipation of previous litigation).15
The district court ruled that nothing in the record
indicated “that the meetings [for which the agendas were
prepared] involved discussion or agenda items about any
particular litigation or that the meetings were in anticipation
of litigation nor do the documents disclose any legal advice or
opinions, or that legal advice was given.”

Instead, the court

ruled that the “meetings were in the nature of product safety
meetings, not legal department meetings.”

As our discussion

makes clear, we disagree with the district court in one important
respect:

we are convinced that the agendas were prepared in

anticipation of litigation.

That the agendas do not necessarily

include legal advice is irrelevant provided, as we note above,
they were prepared in anticipation of litigation.
15

Moreover, it

As in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, there is “an identity
of subject matter” between the litigation for which the material
was prepared and the present litigation. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 803. We therefore need not decide
whether the work product doctrine protects material
prepared for any previous litigation, or only previous litigation
related to the present litigation.
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is of no import that the meetings for which the agendas were
prepared were not legal department meetings.

In this case, the

context in which the agendas were discussed does not change the
reasons for their preparation.
In sum, we conclude that the work product doctrine, as
codified in Rule 26(b)(3), protects the agendas from discovery.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the order of the district court
dated December 18, 1996 will be reversed in part and the case
remanded to the district court with directions to deny discovery
of the documents stamped with Bates numbers 6680-82, 13882,
14236, and 21831 in their entirety, and to deny discovery of the
handwritten notations on the document stamped with Bates number
14241.
___________________________________

TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.

BY THE COURT:
______________________
Circuit Judge
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